![]() Second, the owner of the Russian ghost ship is based in Vladivostok. ![]() We think the cars were offloaded in this area. And here is why we think that: First, the ship’s last reported destination before the transponder was turned off was a coal port next to Vladivostok. So where did the containers go? Vladivostok, Russia. But the handoff happens weeks later in South Korea. Satellite images we found suggest that it tried to pick up the cars at other ports in Asia. Our reporting also shows that this ship was trailing the cargo as soon as it entered China. Using that many jurisdictions is a classic sanctions evasion strategy. And its safety manager is based in Hong Kong. But you’d never know it because it sails under the flag of the West African nation Togo. It’s Do Young Shipping that’s owned by the Russian national. But shortly before it gets the cars, its name changes to DN5505 and its ownership is transferred to Do Young Shipping, a shell company in the Marshall Islands. It used to be called Xiang Jin and had links to North Korea. Its convoluted background offers clues as to why it was not at all a regular transport. So, what just happened? Let’s take a closer look at this ghost ship. Eighteen days later, the ship reappears, but now the cars are gone. It picks up the containers and when it leaves the port, mysteriously vanishes, turning off its required transponder. And here, the Russian-owned ship at the center of our investigation enters the picture. From here, the cars are shipped to Japan, and from there they are sent in yet another ship to another port in Busan, South Korea. After a 41 day journey, the cars arrive in China. From here, they’re transported on a major international shipping line. The cars are on two of the containers on this ship. The first part of the journey looks like a regular shipment. And the trail starts: in a shipping terminal in Rotterdam in June 2018. So first, let’s take a look at the actual route. Our story offers a glimpse into how North Korea skirts sanctions and how it likely uses similar techniques to procure far more dangerous goods. We followed them through a circuitous network of ports, apparently designed to cloak their movement, and onto a ghost ship owned by a Russian businessman whose company has been accused of evading sanctions. These vehicles cost at least $500,000 and are primarily marketed to world leaders. Using shipping and corporate data, satellite images and interviews, we investigated a shipment of two bulletproof Mercedes. ![]() But how did Kim manage to get these luxury, bulletproof vehicles - in open violation of an international ban on luxury goods - to North North Korea? To answer this question, we teamed up with the non-profit research group Center for Advanced Defense Studies, which published a detailed report on sanctions evasions. And when looking at the dictator’s high-profile public appearances, it would be difficult not to notice that they all share something in common: Mercedes. He now frequently leaves North Korea and welcomes top officials in Pyongyang. Kim Jong-un is becoming a more prominent figure on the world stage. Using shipping data, corporate records, satellite imagery and interviews, our investigation tracks the circuitous routes used to import illicit goods. sanctions intended to ban luxury goods from North Korea. Transcript How Kim Jong-un Smuggled Luxury Mercedes to North Korea Kim Jong-un frequently shows off the Mercedes he has obtained in open defiance of U.N.
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